Although the cost of the war both in money and blood has been very high and mistakes have been made in conducting the conflict in Afghanistan, the U.S. has a moral obligation to stay, writes FPA contributor Mehdi Noorbaksh.
September 9, 2010
As the United States ends its combat mission in Iraq, the conflict in Afghanistan now moves to center stage. Unfortunately, the situation in Afghanistan is far gloomier than portrayed in the media and by Washington. The military surge of an additional 30,000 troops by the Obama administration has not succeeded in preventing the Taliban from aggressively controlling more territory, using more roadside bombs against NATO forces and orchestrating a rise in suicide bombings and assassination operations. Furthermore, the NATO operation in Marjah this year did not produce the desired outcome of rooting out the Taliban from this opium producing district in Helmand province. The Kandahar offensive, which was planned to bring this southern region under the control of the Afghan government, was postponed.
As a result of such failures, two thousand NATO soldiers have been killed and more than 300 billion dollars spent on the war in Afghanistan. The increasing cost of American involvement, coupled with the Taliban's escalating, hard-hitting terrorist acts has encouraged some to question America's military role in that country. Recently leaked information which further discloses the extent of corruption in Afghanistan, highlights speculation regarding the role of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence in the conflict coupled with the killing of many Afghan civilians by occupation forces, adds to the confusion about the type and nature of the war that NATO forces are waging in that country. The proponents of American disengagement argue that after nine years of war that have yet to yield the desired results, the time has come for the United States to leave Afghanistan.
Although the cost of the war both in money and blood has been very high and mistakes have been made in conducting the conflict in Afghanistan, this is the wrong conclusion to draw. Without American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban can easily topple the Afghan government in Kabul. American engagement in Afghanistan can be defended by four assertions. Together, they constitute the foundation of an argument which is significant to be understood in the context of the American foreign policy and the principles that it should hold on to in the future.
First, America has a moral obligation to stay in Afghanistan. American intervention in Afghanistan did not begin in September of 2001 as a result of Al-Qaeda terrorism. The U.S. has been involved in Afghan affairs since July 3, 1979 when President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. In 1978 the communists, with the backing of the former Soviet Union, organized a successful bloody coup against Davoud Khan and toppled his regime in Kabul. The United States began to actively instigate and support opposition to the pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul. In December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor to President Carter, said later, “The day that Soviets officially crossed border, I wrote to President Carter, in substance: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow was forced to fight an unwinnable war, a fact that helped lead to the demoralization, and eventually, breakup of the Soviet empire.
The Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, but the country that was left behind after more than a decade of war was destroyed, remaining without an economy or infrastructure. President George H. W. Bush turned a blind eye on Afghanistan, which was in ruin and chaos. The Afghans defeated the Soviet Union for the United States, but received no assistance in rebuilding their country. Left unguarded against the influence of Pakistan, that neighbor put together the Taliban as a force to stabilize the country for the interests of Islamabad. Consequently, America now owes a moral debt to the Afghans to stay and rebuild their country, a debt which was ignored in 1992.
Second, if morality is a guide to human behavior, ethics distinguishes between right and wrong. It would be ethically wrong to give up Afghanistan to the Taliban, a force both ideologically rigid and blind, as well as politically violent in nature. Ideologically, the Taliban subscribe to the Deobandi reading of Islam, a faith that began as a movement by Darul Ulum Deoband in 1866 in Deoband, one hundred miles north of Delhi in India. Although the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam is considered a rigid interpretation of the faith, Deobandism is even more rigid, with a political slant. Deobandi Muslims subscribe to a very literal and austere reading of faith; they oppose interaction between
Muslims and people of other faiths and are vehemently against any Western influence in the Muslim world. From the beginning, this movement opposed British colonial rule in India and later became active in the politics of Pakistan, where it is widely practiced. Among its tenets, Deobandism encourages violent jihad in any part of the world for the protection of Muslims and the Muslim community (Ummah). When it comes to the definition of a Muslim, they have rigid criteria that exclude many, including Shiites who they refer to as non-Muslim. In Pakistan Deobandism has an affiliated political party, Jamiat Ulema Islami, which is active in that country's politics. High ranking officials in Pakistan have been accused of stoking the Deobandi/Taliban movement for political gain. Former president Musharraf himself was a Deobandi Muslim. Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister of, with the help of the Pakistani ISI, used this force to safeguard the interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan, as well as expand their influence against India.
The Talibani movement believes in violence especially against non-Muslims without recognizing or respecting any international human rights norms, including the right to education for women, and they believe in establishing a government which rules through force. Leaving Afghanistan to such a rigid ideology and violent force is unethical. If the Taliban takes hold of power in Afghanistan, its gross human rights violations will soon shame the United States and the international community.
Third, the Taliban's hold on power and government in Afghanistan will encourage like-minded international terrorist organizations, especially in the Muslim world, to connect to this regime. All of the terrorist organizations from the Muslim world are anti-Western and in search of establishing a Taliban-style government in their regions. If in power, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would recreate a new opportunity for these terrorist organizations to aggressively expand and vigorously promote their ideologies. If today Americans and NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan, this act would be considered their defeat and a victory for the Taliban. The implication of such a situation is very complex and exceptionally dangerous. A Talibani victory teaches the lesson that terrorism pays off. This is not a lesson that the international community should allow. The fight against terrorist organizations and ideologies must continue unabated if we prefer peace to war, stability to instability and cooperation to antagonism. Since September 11th, global terrorist activities have been executed through loosely connected organizations, but a country like Afghanistan and a government under the Taliban would make it cohesive, centralized and global. Fighting this new enemy with increased resources would likely be more difficult than the enemy we now combat and understand.
Fourth, if the Taliban were to form a new regime in Afghanistan, they could involve many outside forces in national affairs. Since Afghanistan is Islamabad's bridge to Central Asia, Pakistan would definitely be the first nation to support a new Taliban regime in their neighbor, having a strategic interest in good relations with whichever government is established. Afghanistan could be also used as a proxy to prevent India's expansion of influence in this region of the world. Pakistani involvement would certainly bring Iranian involvement in support of the former Northern Alliance friends. Neighboring Russia, India in opposition to Pakistani influence, and Saudi Arabia along with other Persian Gulf states to partner ideologically with the Taliban, all would become embroiled in Afghani politics under the new rule. This would lead toward regional instability, provoking tension and conflict in that part of the world. The United States cannot remain indifferent to such developments.
America and NATO's mistakes in the conduct of the war in Afghanistan have been abundant.
Afghanistan was put on the back burner for years while the Bush administration conducted the war in Iraq. What Afghanistan needed from the time of the American and NATO invasion was the building of an infrastructure and viable economy. Instead, the United States war strategy was geared toward military operation against terrorism. Once again, Afghanistan became a war zone for military operations, not generating considerable attention in the arena of nation-building of the economy, infrastructure, education and politics. Extensive NATO military operations damaged the support that the country needed from its own population in an effort to eradicate Taliban from the politics of this nation.
A United Nations report released in August revealed the number of innocent Afghans killed or injured in the last six months increased dramatically by 31 percent compared to the first half of 2009. The number of children killed or injured reached 565, increasing 55 percent this year. 2010 has been the bloodiest year with more than 3,268 have been killed or injured thus far. The Taliban invested in Afghani apprehension and fear with military occupation and operation in order to expand. On a trip to France in the second week of August, the president of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, said,” I believe that the international community, which Pakistan belongs to, is in the process of losing the war against Taliban and that is, above all, because we have lost the battle for hearts and minds.”
Washington has concluded that military solution to the Afghan problem is no longer a viable solution. Karzai government and the administration in Washington recognized that political solution must be coupled with other alternative solutions for a viable resolution to the conflict. The proposal to negotiate with Taliban is gaining recognition in Europe and the United States. Through the Saudi Arabian support, the Karzai government has taken the initiative for negotiations with Taliban. It has to be understood that any negotiation with the Taliban leadership, without first stripping the movement from its power base, could be enormously dangerous and counterproductive. Many who have joined Taliban, have done it for economic and security reasons. By establishing incentives, the United States can encourage these groups and forces to disassociate themselves with Taliban. Only then, a weaker Taliban could be negotiated with for the best result.
The United States cannot afford to leave Afghanistan because it is not a war of choice, but a war of necessity, not only for the security of this nation but also for moral principles. America lost much of its moral authority in waging a war against Iraq.. The U.S. cannot afford to leave Afghanistan behind in ruin..The only acceptable outcome is an Afghanistan that is at peace with itself and no longer poses a threat to global stability.
Dr. Mehdi Noorbaksh is associate professor of international affairs at Harrisburg University of Science and Technology in PA. Additionally, he is vice president of the World Affairs Council in Harrisburg, Fellow, Center for International Studies, University of St. Thomas in Houston and
President of Southwestern International Studies Association
